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FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION AND
THE SMALL TAXPAYER

L. Hart Wright*

The actual or supposed complexity of substantive federal tax
law has generated two unresolved administrative by-products of
peculiar importance in the case of small taxpayers. In each of
these circumstances the Internal Revenue Service (and in one, the
Congress) has tended to default on its programmatic responsibility
to facilitate payment by small taxpayers of no less and no more
than they owe under the tax law.
For too long and to too large an extent, these taxpayers, although completely bewildered and devoid of self-confidence in the
conduct of their tax affairs, have had to fend for themselves, both
at return time, and later-at the point of an audit-in dealing with
personnel of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service). In
the first instance, concerning a small taxpayer's dilemma at return
time, the principal adverse consequence is suffered by the tax
system itself (or by all other taxpayers viewed in aggregate), and
the cumulative prejudice has now reached alarming proportions.
In the second instance, of the relatively few small taxpayers
audited after having filed returns, only the individual small taxpayer actually undergoing audit is likely to suffer prejudice from
his dilemma.
Both circumstances warrant remedial action.

I.

ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL TAXPAYERS
AT RETURN TIME

A. ChronologicalProfile of the Past
The problem regarding assistance at return time ultimately requires resolution of one general question: to what extent does the
government itself have a responsibility to see that small tax*Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., 1938, LL.B., 1941,
University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1942, University of Michigan.
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payers, whether provided for by the IRS or by some other means,
have theproper kind of aid in preparing their returns? In trying to
determine the correct answer, a brief chronology of the federal
reaction to this problem and the consequence thereof will provide
a healthy perspective.
That the government's traditional reaction can be characterized
alternatively as either too little or as totally blind to over half the
problem is not to say that it has traditionally been wholly insensitive to the plight or bewilderment of small taxpayers. For
example, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue appointed by
President Kennedy, Mortimer Caplin, emphasized in a message to
the Secretary of the Treasury that the government's own taxpayer
assistance effort was a necessary "component of the Service's
program of fostering voluntary compliance." 1 As to the extent of
help provided in a given case, however, he also acknowledged
that in "recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the
use of the telephone to assist taxpayers because it requires less
2
time on the part of both taxpayer and Service personnel."
The extent of this emphasis, reflecting in a large sense the
actual limited thrust of the program in the Kennedy era, is indicated by data covering the last year of Commissioner Caplin's
tenure, fiscal 1964.3 Approximately 14.4 million taxpayers received assistance only over the telephone. Of the 8.6 million other
taxpayers who personally came to one of the IRS offices for aid,
the assistance accorded 7 million consisted of nothing more than
4
answers to specific inquiries.
Given this stress in the then otherwise quite limited program,
Commissioner Caplin would have done well not to have ignored
so completely the other side of the coin, namely, the consequent
emergence of a completely unregulated, outside commercial return-preparation industry. Illustratively, the customer list of one
such small company, then not known to most taxpayers but later
to become a household word, tripled during Commissioner Cap5
lin's term of office, reaching 400,000 names in 1963.
During the next seven years, up to the time when President
Nixon's first appointed Commissioner, Randolph Thrower, left
1 1963 COMM'R

INT. REV. ANN. REP. 4.

2 1961 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 12.

3 Since Commissioner Caplin left office at the end of fiscal year 1964, the report
covering that period actually was signed by his successor, Acting Commissioner Harding,
who also emphasized that help via telephone was "the method stressed as the type of
assistance taxpayers normally should seek." 1964 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 3.
4 Id.
- Hearings on H.R. 7590 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations,92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson H.R. 7590].
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office in mid- 197 1, the government did expand its taxpayer assistance program, principally, however, only with respect to its
educational component. For example, by then a kit-"Teaching
Taxes"-was being supplied to 21,000 high schools for use by
teachers in helping students learn how to prepare returns.6 The
government also enlarged the volunteer income tax assistance
(VITA) program, under which volunteers from civic organizations
and the like were trained to help senior citizens and others prepare their returns; in 1971 these volunteers assisted 172,000
7
taxpayers.
Taxpayers themselves learned, however, from the last
tax-return packet they received from Commissioner Thrower that
the Service had discontinued the short form 1040A. This change,
although apparently prompted by the most decent motives,8 obviously further complicated small taxpayers' lives as they saw it. a
Nevertheless, on the cover of the tax packet mailed to taxpayers in January, 1972, the succeeding Commissioner, Johnnie
M. Walters, still felt justified in saying: "We believe most American taxpayers can make their own tax returns for 1971 ." After
explaining why the Service held this conviction, the message went
on to acknowledge that a given taxpayer might feel otherwise
because, illustratively, he might think it would be more profitable
for him to itemize his deductions rather than to take the standard
deduction. In such a case, the message reminded him, the Service
could "not make the computations" for him, although, as before,
it said, "Your local Internal Revenue Service office stands
ready," free of charge, "to help you by answering your questions."
To the taxpayer who felt he needed help beyond that available
from the Service, the message stated that the taxpayer bore the
responsibility to determine that the person employed to assist in
preparation of a return was "both competent and trustworthy."
This abbreviated recital of the Service's reaction through 197 1
to the needs and obligations of taxpayers at return time is offered
only to make two matters crystal clear. The first is not that the
government in that era disclaimed responsibility to render assistance to the small taxpayer at filing time. Rather, it is that a very
substantial difference developed over this period between the tax
6 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 6.

7 Id.
8
See 1970 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 4. Under the old short form 1040A, taxpayers
could not claim head-of-household status, sick-pay exclusions, and certain other benefits to
which they otherwise might be entitled.
9
id.
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experts who ran the Service on the one hand, and small taxpayers
on the other, regarding the character of the latter's "need" during
the filing season.
This proposition is easily demonstrated. The previously mentioned commercial company, which just seven years before had
prepared only 400,000 returns and which was then not known to
most people, found itself in 1971 preparing 7,200,000 returns 1 °
This figure was equal to 10 percent of all individual returns filed,"
and the name of the firm, H & R Block, had indeed become
widely known. While the operations of H & R Block had become
giant-like when compared with the operations of other
pygmy-sized commercial return-preparation services, the small
taxpayers' view of their own need had led thousands of small
operators to enter this profitable industry. As a result, after the
close of 1971, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue acknowledged that there might be as many as 200,000 commercial return
preparers. 2 This is at least a reasonable approximation, given two
other pieces of otherwise relevant data. H & R Block alone, in
1971, used 28,500 workers.1 3 Its franchisees employed another
15,000,14 and together they prepared less than one-third1 5 of the
46 percent of all individual returns which, according to the Commissioner, were prepared for taxable year 1971 by someone other
16
than the taxpayer himself.
These data merely illustrate that, whatever tax experts in the
IRS may have thought, by 1971 taxpayers themselves viewed
their needs in terms of a demand for services involving 200,000
workers. Admittedly, most of the latter were only seasonally
engaged and often then only part-time. Nevertheless, their absolute number was more than three times the total of the Service's
7
entire employee roster.'
Furthermore, because the giant of the return-preparation industry, H & R Block, reported fee receipts of $87,000,000 in
1971,18 quite obviously small taxpayers must have paid several
times that amount to the horde of other commercial preparers.
10Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 84, 108.
11 In 1971, 76.6 million individual income tax returns were filed. 1971 COMM'R INT.
REV. ANN. REP. 15.

12 Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 20, 197.
13 Id. at 85. Only 85 percent of these employees actually prepared returns. Many of the
others acted in the capacity of checkers and other functions.

14 Id. at 79.
15This assumes that the franchisees' employees each prepared approximately the same

number of returns as were prepared, per person, by H & R Block's own employees.
16Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 37.
17 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 66 (reporting that 61,952 permanent and 7,035
temporary employees were engaged by the IRS in 1971).
18Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 85.
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This total expenditure dwarfed in size the then relatively microscopic cost of the Service's own taxpayer assistance program.1 9
In fact there can be no doubt that this figure was closer to, and
probably even larger than, the $357,000,000 manpower cost of
the entire IRS audit force for 1971.20
The striking difference between the attitudes of the Service and
taxpayers regarding the character of the latter's needs at filing
time was, through 1971, complemented by the second equally
traditional, but more disastrous, governmental supposition previously mentioned. The IRS had assumed that small taxpayers,
although unable or unwilling to learn enough about the tax terrain
to enable them to prepare their own returns, somehow would
know enough to bear alone the responsibility, as the Commissioner put it in the covering letter on 197 i return packets, to see that
persons employed to do their work were "competent and
trustworthy." In the face of a rapidly growing, highly competitive,
and completely unregulated commercial preparation industry, this
erroneous supposition has left in its wake something akin to a
disaster.
While the Commissioner himself understandably might shy
away from such a characterization, it was he, in 1972, who exposed the fact that sample examinations of returns filed by 3,174
preparers revealed that over 2,200 "appeared to have prepared
incorrect returns," 21 and that a pilot project covering just one
region indicated that a very significant percentage "of the returns
being prepared by return preparers in that.., seven-state region
were being fraudulently prepared." 22 Indeed, the latter test
showed that only thirty out of 536 commercially prepared returns
were correct and that the "average loss of tax per return was
$234.99."23 In aggregate, this amounted to $1,025,954.96 for just
24
those 506 returns.
B. Profile of Current Governmental Reaction
On acknowledging to the nation, in 1972, the dimensions of the
difficulty in which we then found ourselves, the Commissioner
19 For 1972, the Service's assistance program during the filing season alone cost about
$13 million, but in 1973 this was to be increased to $18.4 million. Id. at 251.
20 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 127. Indeed, the Commissioner himself estimated that total fees paid by all taxpayers to all preparers probably "were in excess of
$600 million per year." Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 198.
21 Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 19. See also id.at 196.
22 Id. at 30. While the Commissioner himself in the cited statement used the figure 97
percent, another witness testified that then Secretary of the Treasury John Connally had
said the correct figure was 19 percent. Id. at 103.
23 Id. at 30.
24
id.
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more or less simultaneously announced that two different types of
corrective steps were being taken.
One set focused on improvement and enlargement of the government's own direct assistance program. First, while the assistance program was formerly carried out under the supervision of a
division director whose "primary interest lay in enforcement actions," 25 a new Taxpayer Service Division was created in December, 1971, with its "sole responsibility" being "to provide services
and assistance to taxpayers." 26 Second, it was decided that the
use of audit and collection agents to staff this function would be
phased out over a two-year period.2 7 Replacing them were to be
28
1,430 full-time assistants, located in about 800 scattered offices.
The number of total assistants was to be increased, it was hoped,
to 5,300 in the peak filing season 29 during which 360 temporary
off-site locations also would be staffed at least part-time.a0 Third,
the Centiphone system, enabling taxpayers in remote areas to
make toll-free telephone calls to a central location, was to be
expanded from the then twenty-six districts to encompass the
entire nation by 1974.31 Fourth, an after-hours program to provide services to taxpayers after normal working hours and on
Saturdays was to be reinstituted. 3 2 Finally, a modified version of
33
the earlier short form 1040A was to be brought back into use.
However commendable these changes may be, one must note
the omission of any suggestion that the Service itself, as a general
practice, would prepare returns for any small taxpayer requesting
such service. The Commissioner had said, in early 1972, that
because of the Service's lack of manpower, such assistance must
be confined to "unusual cases where the taxpayer for some reason
simply cannot make his return." 34 Later, however, he expressed
the hope that increased manpower would enable the Service during 1973 to more than double the number of returns prepared for
25Id. at 2 1 (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 22. In ultimate effect, however, whereas formerly the government's chief audit
official (Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)) had jurisdiction over the assistance program, now that jurisdiction is exercised by the chief collection official (Assistant Commissioner (Accounts, Collection and Taxpayer Service) ). Id.
27
28

Id.
Id. at 250. The efforts of these employees will not, however, be devoted exclusively

to assistance during the filing season, for 36 percent of all inquiries are made after that
season is over and concern various problems including, for example, collection matters.
Indeed the nonfiling season assistance will absorb $15.2 million of the $33.6 million
assistance budget projected for 1973. Id. at 25 1.
29

Id. at 250.

30

Unpublished data furnished by the IRS.
Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 23.
Id. at 23, 24.

31
32

33
34

Id. at 29.
id.at 22.
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taxpayers in 1972, reaching perhaps 3.5 million, 3 5 although even
this would be less than half the number prepared by H & R Block
alone.
A second set of remedial steps represented an acknowledgement by the IRS that the tax system itself should assume some
responsibility regarding the integrity and competence of the commercial preparer industry. Initial steps, however, were directed
only at the matter of integrity. Fraud charges were immediately
6
initiated against a number of allegedly fraudulent preparers0
Complementing this was a cooperative effort with the Federal
Trade Commission to enjoin those commercial preparation ser37
vices indulging in deceptive advertising.
The long-range solution, according to the Commissioner, is still
under consideration, 38 although with respect to both the matter of
competence and integrity, he expressed a tentative preference for
a system of new after-the-fact penalties to be meted out to preparers whose prepared returns proved they were untrustworthy or
incompetent.3 9 A licensing system, designed in the first instance
to qualify within the industry only those of character and competence, would, in his view, "consume too much manpower
needed by IRS compliance work," 40 and would be "beyond any
resources we are likely to secure at this time." 41 The annual cost
42
of licensing was put at $17.5 million.
C. The Ultimate Issue Viewed in PracticalTerms
An objective appraisal, responsive to the manner in which our
tax system actually operates, leads to at least one inescapable
conclusion: the system itself, rather than any given taxpayer
alone, acting in its own interest and to protect the legitimate
interest of all other taxpayers, must bear the primary responsibility of assuring that those who make it their business, either in
or out of government, to prepare returns for others are "competent and trustworthy."
This follows from the cumulative effect of two propositions.
First, each taxpayer has a legitimate interest in having every other
31 Id. at 250 (letter from Commissioner Johnnie M. Waiters to Hon. John S. Monagan,
Sept. I, 1972).
a6 Id. at 25, 33.
37 Id. at 25.
38
See id. at 27.
39
See id.
40
41

42

Id.
Id. at 26.

Id. at 198.
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taxpayer ultimately pay the correct tax. Furthermore, the legitimacy of this interest extends to the correctness of returns as
initially filed, for thereafter not more than 2 percent can be audited despite the fact that two-thirds of the returns actually audited in 1971 were deemed by the IRS Audit Division to warrant
an adjustment. 43 Second, if millions of small taxpayers have demonstrated- and they have unequivocally- that they are either unwilling or unable to engage in the self-education required to enable
them to prepare their own returns, this also means they will not
know enough about tax terrain to enable them to determine
whether the person who does prepare their return is competent,
and, if that person is at all subtle, whether he is trustworthy.
Relevant to this is the fact that the small taxpayer hopes to pay
the smallest fee possible and, therefore, does not want to incur the
added cost of a greater degree of competence than his return
requires. Given the taxpayer's legitimate competing concerns of
cost and a minimum required competence, and also of his own
inadequate understanding of the law, it is the height of folly to
expect him to be able to determine whether a given preparer has
the requisite competence to do his return.
If from all this it follows that the system itself, acting in its own
interest and in protecting the legitimate interests of other taxpayers, must bear the principal responsibility to assure competence and honesty on the part of those who make it their
business to prepare returns for others, the only real issue worthy
of argument is whether the tax system itself (i.e., the government)
should now begin to try to supply the requisite preparation-type
service, or whether, in light of the ever-present problem of priorities, its first need is to develop an effective regulatory program
regarding the commercial preparer industry.
D. A ProposedSolution
On the one hand, arguing in favor of the government's assumption of a major return-preparation burden are the expectations
generated in the American people by the practices of the economic community in which they have been reared. They are bound to
think it is a most unusual creditor who is unwilling to take out
pencil and paper and calculate, at the point at which they are

I In

197 1, of the 1,529,454 returns examined, the Audit Division proposed adjustments

to 1,006,325. 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 33. H & R Block had indicated that

only half of I% of the returns prepared by it are audited by the Service. Hearings on H.R.
7590, supra note 5, at 104.
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ready to pay, the exact amount owed. An unwillingness to do that
on the part of their own government is no doubt peculiarly exasperating to a taxpayer-debtor who believes at return time that he
simply does not understand how to calculate it himself. This
argument, at first blush, no doubt is appealing to all Americans,
who might characterize, perhaps almost emotionally, the government's unwillingness as an unbecoming bureaucratic exception to
a quite general, customary creditor practice.
Yet in terms of priority needs, there is encountered on the
other side of the basic issue a much more awesome array of valid
arguments. At the outset, it is imperative to recognize that a large
commercial return-preparation industry will survive regardless of
what the government otherwise does programmatically, and that
effective government oversight regarding the competence and integrity of that industry will itself require substantial additional
funding.
A large industry will survive in any event because of the
cumulative impact of at least five factors. First, there is the matter
of habit. Millions of small taxpayers are now in the habit of using
a commercial return preparer. No doubt, a substantial proportion
are reasonably satisfied with the service rendered. This habit
pattern would not be easy to reverse overnight, if at all. 4 Second,
there is the matter of convenience. There are over 6,435 so-called
urban areas in the United States with a population of 2,500 or
more. 4 5 At this moment, even under the newly expanded IRS
program, taxpayer assistants are to be stationed in only 800
permanent, scattered offices, although in some areas their
work -presently consisting primarily of answering questions- will
be complemented in certain off-site locations and by "taxmobiles"
6
which visit shopping centers and other appropriate locations.
Compare these circumstances, however, with the fact that H & R
Block alone and its franchisees maintained 6,431 tax offices in
1972. 4 7 Furthermore, tens of thousands of other commercial pre-

parers, who frequently operated only temporarily in homes or
otherwise vacant store fronts, were able to exist, presumably with
a profit. In part their existence may derive from the fact that they
were even more conveniently located to neighboring taxpayers
4 For example, H & R Block indicated that, although its customers increased from
6,800,000 in 1970 to7,200,000 in 1971, about 70 percent of its 1971 customers were
"repeats." Id. at 84, 79.
45 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES: 1971, at
17 (92d ed.).
46 See notes 28 and 30 supra.
47 Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 84.
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than H & R Block offices. It would stretch the imagination to
conceive that the government would be willing or able to operate
with the degree of convenience to which taxpayers have become
accustomed through the use of commercial services.
A third factor which would contribute in any event to the
outside industry's survival relates to the range of services to
which the small taxpayer has become accustomed. Commercial
preparers prepare not only a taxpayer's federal return, but also his
state return. For example, recognizing the migratory character of
the local population, the H & R Block office in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, keeps on hand blank returns used by all fifty states, in
order to accommodate the customer who moved in mid-year from
one state to another. 48 Whatever the IRS ultimately does in providing assistance with respect to federal returns, it is likely that it
would resist to the end the taking on of this complementary
state-return burden.
A fourth contributing factor concerns an easily demonstrable,
but ugly, fact of our lives, namely, the growing distrust toward
many of our important institutions, including government at all
levels. There is ample reason to suspect, at this state of our
nation's life, that millions of our small taxpayers, although honest,
might rather pay a relatively modest fee to a commercial preparer
than place their trust in one of the enforcing agency's own employees. Indeed, in one type of circumstance their distrust, whether or not they comprehend the more subtle implications, is well
founded. Reference here is to a dilemma which is common even
to the existing question-and-answer type of assistance program.
Pivotal in this respect is the question of whom does the government assistor really represent.
Obviously this dilemma arises only in instances where competing arguments actually could be advanced regarding the correct
answer to a tax question. In the 1920's, the Congress itself
created what is now known as the Tax Court primarily because it
believed that as to a truly arguable item a taxpayer should be able
to carry the matter even through the judicial arena before being
required to pay the amount of tax associated with that type of
contested item. In short, even in the eyes of Congress, a taxpayer
need not forfeit his interest in an otherwise arguable item, voluntarily paying the amount otherwise attributable to that item, without a judicial determination that the tax is properly due. 49 Indeed,
48 Since no commercial preparers can hope to know much about the income tax laws of
fifty different states, state commissioners of revenue have just cause to worry about the
correctness of returns covering taxpayers who moved in mid-year.
49 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
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not surprisingly it is customary for both professional accountants
and lawyers, in handling a client's affiairs, to resolve arguable
items in the taxpayer's favor. Last year, in speaking to a congressional committee, even the president of a nonprofit, all-volunteer
organization (Community Tax Aid, Inc.) engaged in preparing
returns without charge for small taxpayers in New York stated
without equivocation that "Questionable items are resolved in
favor of the taxpayer; he is entitled to no less." 50 To this writer's
knowledge, similar instructions have not been issued by the Service either to its enforcement personnel or to employees in the
assistance program. In fact the last known instructions to enforcement personnel were to the opposite effect. 5 l
A fifth reason why a large commercial return-preparation industry will survive even if the IRS should try to expand its own
preparation-type service program involves the matter of cost. As
a practical matter, one simply cannot conceive that Congress
would provide the requisite funds-regardless of the merits of
such a proposal-to try to do even half of the return preparation
work now done, to say nothing of undertaking the whole job.
During the filing season in 1971, H & R Block and its franchisees
alone had 43,500 employees, to say nothing of the estimated
52
150,000 other preparers engaged in this work.
Consideration must also be given, in respect of the matter of
cost, to what is involved in preparing a return, for whatever is
involved, the government, to undertake the job at all, must do it
50

Hearings on h.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 219.

51 L. H. WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 36-42 (1970). The purpose here is not to quibble with the Service's

existing instructions to its personnel. Rather it is to highlight (I) one dilemma the government encounters in trying both to provide assistance and also to enforce the law, and (2)
the complementary dilemma faced by small taxpayers in having the IRS prepare their
returns.
A closely related problem which would be raised if the government sought to prepare a
substantial number of returns relates to the significance attached to the fact that a
government employee signs the return as preparer. If we are to say that all such returns
are thereby immunized from the audit program, then as a practical matter a portion of
these returns require an audit at the very point they are being prepared, with all the
complementary, time-consuming, practical difficulties that will entail. In contrast, if we say
that such returns will be free of the audit program except in cases of taxpayer fraud, it still
would be necessary to conduct some audits at the very point of preparation if only because
some taxpayers will supply erroneous subtotal figures, not because there was any intention
to commit fraud, but simply because of their lack of knowledge regarding the niceties of
the law. Furthermore, ro gear the line of demarcation to fraud would open up the problem
always triggered when hard-to-prove subjective intent fixes the dividing line. Consider how
easy it would be for a given taxpayer to say that the government employee orally told him
that a given figure was appropriate, and how hard it would be for any such employee to
remember what he told that one, out of hundreds of taxpayers served.
52 Even in light of minimizing costs or assuring efficiency it is unlikely that the government agency would adopt the quite modest guaranteed pay per hour or the complementary
and questionable piecework pay formula used by H & R Block. No doubt these techniques
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properly. To prepare a return for someone implies that, if done
properly, much more than a mere act of penmanship will be
required. Implied is the supposition that a knowledgeable preparer
will take the time to ask the taxpayer numerous questions and
subquestions, all to the end of being sure that proper account has
been taken of every advantage to which the taxpayer is entitled
under law. Even now, particularly at the height of the filing
season, one should worry over the prospect that government
employees who assist taxpayers, although only asked by a taxpayer to respond to a general question, will not take the time in
replying first to raise all the other requisite questions necessary in
trying to get a grip on all the facts which must be understood
before the employee can, wisely, fairly, and precisely, respond to
the taxpayer's actual problem, a problem frequently initially obscured by the generality of the taxpayer's first question.
Be that as it may, the five factors previously mentioned-taxpayer habits, their convenience, the problem of state
returns, the growing distrust toward government, and the awesome cost of large scale return-preparation services-when
viewed cumulatively clearly suggest that whatever the government tries to do programmatically, a big commercial return-preparation industry will survive and continue to prepare a
substantial proportion of returns filed.
Given this, the question becomes what should the government
now do, in terms of priorities. The scandalous circumstances,
reflected in previously mentioned data released by the IRS as to
the quality of work done by at least a segment of this industry,
obviously indicates that the first need is to develop an oversight
program covering the industry. Indeed, given the fact that IRS
can audit less than 2 percent of all small returns, and the facts that
the industry is devoid of an organizational structure, lacking in
century-old professional traditions, wholly unencumbered by any
educational requirements or standards of proficiency, composed
in large part of thousands of independent operators who move in
and out of the business like transients, but led by a giant which
expends enormous sums on advertising, and with competition
are used as a management tool to achieve efficiency and to maximize profit. Mr. Block
testified in 1972 that tax preparers were paid
a minimum of $ 1.60 per hour against 20 percent of fees received for returns
prepared, for the first-year employee. Thereafter, the tax preparer is guaranteed an hourly rate equal to 80 percent of the previous year's hourly earnings
(not less than $1.60 per hour) against 20 percent of fees received for the
returns prepared and a longevity increase.
Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 93. Given this, an off-the-cuff, uneducated guess
would be that the government in fact, quality aside, is not likely to do the job as
inexpensively as it is done by the private sector.
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being the norm among the larger enterprises of the industry, the
IRS should never have supposed other than that a regulatory
system would be necessary.
The practical problem with this approach is that neither the
administration nor Congress may be willing to face up to the fact
that an effective regulatory program will not be inexpensive and
will thus require additional funds.
Additional funds will be required for several reasons. The first
reason is that it would be unthinkable to allow the Service to try
to absorb the cost by reducing its current audit or collection
programs. 5 3 Nor, second, can the IRS be relieved of the principal
assistance-type burden it now assumes, namely, to answer questions, primarily over the telephone or in a government office,
usually from those taxpayers (still 54 percent of the total) 5 4 who
seek otherwise through self-help to determine for themselves what
they owe the government. The government must continue to
provide at least this degree of help, for no taxpayer alone is
responsible for the complexity of the tax law. Help of this type,
reflecting the government's interpretation of the law, is also a
proper cost to be borne by the system itself, to say nothing of the
further fact that it obviously serves the government's self-interest
to answer a given taxpayer's questions. Indeed, applause was
warranted when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in 1972,
announced that this assistance effort would be augmented, that
field offices would be open evenings and Saturdays to accommodate this function during the filing season, and that by 1974 the
Centiphone system, enabling taxpayers in remote areas to make
toll-free telephone calls to a central location, would be expanded
from the then twenty-six districts to encompass, by 1974, the
entire nation.
A third reason supporting the need for additional funds is that
absent these funds the Service, to avoid inroads on those programs, will foster an inexpensive but ineffective oversight program designed for public consumption to indicate that it is, at long
last, attacking the problems the return-preparer industry has been
permitted to generate. It almost goes without saying that a supposedly inexpensive program will serve only as a display window,
leaving unresolved the real problem which is inside the store.
53 Indeed there is reason to believe the audit program is underfunded now, given the fact
that, while less than 2 percent of returns are audited, in 1971 the Audit Division proposed

adjustments to two-thirds of the returns audited. 1971 COMM'R INT.. REV. ANN. REP. 33.
At the end of fiscal year 1971, the Collection Division had an inventory of 759,000
delinquent accounts, involving $1.9 billion, this being $87 million more than the previous
year's closing inventory. Id. at 25.
54 Hearings on H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 37.
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In short, at stake is a choice between two programmatic approaches. One program ostensibly would seek to penalize preparers after they have been actually caught doing wrong. The
other, while also including some system of penalties, would also
gear much of the effort toward preventing wrongs before they are
committed. This approach would employ a licensing system which
would qualify only those who proved themselves, prima facie, to
be competent and trustworthy. The Service has already indicated
a preference for the first or penalty approach, deeming the alternative licensing arrangement "effective only if accompanied by
strictly enforced standards of performance and integrity"; the IRS
also believes that given the large number of preparers, there is
"no realistic way" for it to perform this task, particularly because
such a program would be "beyond any resources we are likely to
55
secure at this time."
Having made that tentative choice, the IRS indicated an interest in asking Congress to consider a program which would (1)
establish a statutory penalty, ranging from 10 to 25 percent of any
tax deficiency caused by a preparer who "knowingly" understates
income, or overstates deductions or credits; (2) authorize the
government to obtain an injunction to prevent further preparation
of returns by a preparer who "consistently prepares false or
deficient returns"; (3) establish a penalty of "approximately $5"
for each return not signed by the preparer; (4) require each
preparer to furnish an annual information return listing all taxpayers and their identification numbers for whom returns were
prepared; and (5) take account of the Service's acknowledged
willingness to prepare model courses and materials and make
them available to schools and universities willing to conduct
courses open to preparers and the general public. 56 This set of
proposals, advanced by the agency which waited far too long
before even openly acknowledging a problem (the horse having
long since left the barn) falls far short, given the stakes, of the
necessary mark.
In this regard consider first the matter of competence. In any
given case, if the competence of a return preparer is the only issue
at stake, the proposed program makes available only one tooth
with any bite-an injunction prohibiting further preparation of
returns where a preparer has "consistently" prepared "deficient"
returns. To propose that this matter of competence be turned over
to the already overcrowded federal courts on a case-by-case basis
55 Id. at 26.
56

Id. at 27-29.
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necessarily assumes (1) that a judicially manageable (and, therefore, only an infinitesimal) fraction of this industry's 200,000
members is incompetent; (2) that federal judges, during the height
of the filing season and before an appropriate remedy becomes
irrelevant because of mootness, would actually grant an injunction
without first requiring the case to be placed at least at the bottom
of the motion docket (and at worst the trial docket) to await, after
some delay, a hearing permitting both sides to present evidence;
(3) that once it becomes clear that evidentiary hearings will first
have to be held- with all that this entails-the Justice Department
would actually initiate a sufficient number of suits annually to
assure a satisfactory industry-wide level of competence; and (4)
that following such suits injunctions would tend to follow. In
summary, to turn this matter of enforcement over to the federal
courts is "to bay at the moon like a dog, thinking you have it
tree'd."
To suppose that a 200,000-man industry, which anyone can
join at any time, includes only a judicially manageable and, therefore, infinitesimal fraction of members lacking in technical proficiency, is to suppose that the IRS itself, although funding at
significant cost a substantial tax-oriented educational program
which must be taken and passed by employees who devote their
audit time to small taxpayers, would have done almost as well to
save the money and use for this purpose any untrained citizen.
To suppose that a federal judge will, at the height of the filing
season and before a particular defendant-preparer has done his
year's worth of damage, deprive him of his livelihood then and
there, without postponing the case for an evidentiary hearing, is to
believe that Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation,5 7 Goldberg
v. Kelly, 5 8 and Bell v. Burson5 9 had not been decided by the
Supreme Court, or as one federal judge suggested to this writer, is
to suppose something that will seldom happen.
To suppose that the Justice Department would actually initiate
many such suits each year, once it becomes clear that evidentiary
hearings will in fact be required, is to demonstrate little knowledge of the Justice Department. In 1971, even in the fraud area,
the Department willingly initiated suits not where it could see the
57 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (held, as a matter of constitutional due process, wages may not
be tied up until after an evidentiary hearing bearing on the validity of the underlying debt).
58397 U.S. 254 (1970) (held, welfare recipients' payments may not, as a matter of due
process be terminated until after an evidentiary hearing bearing on eligibility). Cf. the
situations dealt with in the line of cases cited id. at 263 n. 10.
59 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (held, uninsured motorist's driver's license, following an accident
and failure to post bond for the amount claimed by an aggrieved party, may not, as a
matter of due process, be suspended until after an evidentiary hearing bearing on fault).
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whites of a fraudulent taxpayer's eyes, but rather only in the more
remote circumstance when it could see behind the inner part of
the taxpayer's retina. Of those brought to trial, two-thirds, or 645,
were so clearly guilty that they pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. 60
To expect equal cooperation even from those few preparers
facing a hearing for an injunction which'will turn on their competence and possibly prejudice their immediate livelihood is to
ignore reality. In attempting to demonstrate his competency such
a defendant might introduce evidence showing that in 1971
two-thirds of all audits, not just of his returns, resulted in an
adjustment. 6 1 He would then indicate the proportion he filed correctly and go on to claim an opportunity to show, as to many of
the incorrect returns he filed, that it was the taxpayer who often
was at fault if fault there be. In short, one cannot assume that
evidentiary hearings will be concluded in a moment's time or that
they necessarily would result in an injunction.
In addition, the somewhat different matter of trustworthiness
must be considered. The primary new weapon proposed here by
the Service is a statutory civil penalty of from 10 to 25 percent of
any tax deficiency caused by a preparer who "knowingly" understates income or overstates deductions or credits. Once again, we
are considering a penalty which could be contested through the
judiciary with all this entails. Here, however, the issue would turn
on the word "knowingly." That word, as well as its ancestors,
lineal descendants, and cousins, is one of the most elusive words
in the English language, as one discovers on seeking to apply it.62
This would be particularly so in this context where the circumstances provide the target of the prosecution, allegedly a crafty
crook, with a built-in patsy. Apart from pointing to the complexity
of the law, the preparer can also point to the taxpayer on whom
he would say he must rely for information necessary to fill out the
return.
In conclusion, it is regrettable that the IRS, which for so long
underestimated the tax system's responsibility regarding commercial preparers, now, in the face of a consequence full blown
601971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 29, 31.
61 Id. at 33.

Indeed, the Commissioner himself said:
It is difficult to be precise at this point [April 24, 1972] as to how many
improprieties are attributable to just plain incompetence and how many
constitute a seemingly willful attempt to defraud the government. Indeed,
some of the "incompetence" unearthed has been so gross as to make nice
distinctions virtually impossible.
Hearingson H.R. 7590, supra note 5, at 196.
62
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and acknowledged by it to be "cause for genuine alarm," 63 nevertheless continues either to underestimate the dimensions of the
problem or to underestimate what is required by way of a remedy.
In either case, the Congress, instead of responding passively,
would serve the nation's tax system better by affirmatively mandating, as a complement to the Service's proposals and existing
arrangements, a return-preparer licensing system. In terms of
additional funding, the Service itself estimated in 1972 that the
cost would be $87.50 per preparer or $17.5 million for 200,000
preparers. This, under its estimate, would accommodate character
investigations, preparation of instructional and test materials, administration and grading of examinations, and issuance of licenses. 6 4 Obviously, the licensees, on the basis of their showings,
would be categorized by the type of returns they are deemed
competent to handle, and their respective license numbers, which
they should be required to add to their name on the return, would
be designed so as to reflect automatically their eligibility to prepare the given type of return on which their name appears.
E. Conclusions ConcerningAssistance at
Return Time
In terms of the relative compelling needs of our tax system,
new funds should be devoted first to a licensing program rather
than to an attempt by the Service to accommodate another million
or so small taxpayers understandably interested in a free return-preparation service from the IRS. The latter, as a practical
matter, would still leave enormous numbers of small taxpayers to
the commercial preparers. Discrimination as to those to whom the
IRS service is available would frequently be dependent on the
taxpayer's mere geographical location.
II.

ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES AND THE SMALL
TAXPAYER

A. Appraising the Exposed Tip of the Enforcement
Iceberg: An Accolade
The exposed tip of an iceberg almost always differs substantially from the base hidden below, and so it is with the tax
system's enforcement arrangement. If one looked only at its ex64

Id.
Id. at 198.
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posed tip, he would conclude on a comparative basis that this
nation's tax enforcement machinery has accomplished an amazing
feat. It has administered the most complicated law known to man
in such a way that, while collecting almost $200 billion in fiscal
year 1971, fewer than 1500 tax cases had to be tried on their
substantive merits before our trial courts. 65 In appraising this feat,
one must remember that the underlying law itself includes several
thousand different sections, and several hundred thousand words.
One must remember also that most of those words, having diverse
shades of meaning, are capable of generating any number of
controversies in the setting of the infinitely varied transactions
consummated in this, the most sophisticated economy known to
man, with only the subtotals of these transactions actually being
reflected in almost 80 million income tax returns received by the
Service in fiscal 1971.
Certainly those fewer than 1500 court cases represented a
small number when compared with the 1,006,325 returns which
the Audit Division proposed to adjust for deficiencies in that same
fiscal year. Viewed internationally, that number of trial court
cases also seems not so large when it is recognized that little
Belgium typically generates almost as many in the administration
of its tax system, that Ohio-sized Netherlands typically requires
more such cases, and that Germany typically generates a greater
number of appeals to its appellate tax courts than are tried in the
66
first instance by our trial courts.
This same exposed tip of the iceberg would generate a second
accolade if only because our Tax Court instituted a Small Claims
Division, enabling those relatively few small taxpayers sufficiently
hardy to carry a tax dispute that far 6 7 to present their cases on a
pro se basis, with a Commissioner of that court having the responsibility, inquisitorially and not as adversary, to take the time,
sometimes substantial, to ask the questions, subquestions, and
sub-subquestions necessary to help that small taxpayer present
and argue his case there.
B. The Base of the Enforcement Iceberg:
One Other Accolade
A profile, not of the exposed tip but of the much larger and
hidden base of the tax system's enforcement iceberg, encompass1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 123 (table 19).
66 L.

H.

WRIGHT et al., COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAX-

34-42 (1968).
67 In calendar year 1972, the Tax Court's Small Claims Division received only 2,258
petitions. While 2,279 such cases were closed out that same year, the court found it
ATION
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ing as it does the system's relationships with hundreds of thousands of small taxpayers, hardly warrants a similar accolade. That
the IRS has not been sufficiently sensitive to the peculiar problems arising out of its audit of small taxpayer's returns does not
mean, however, that it has been wholly insensitive to the plight
and bewilderment of small taxpayers who are at the point of audit.
Indeed, the government has shown increasing concern, albeit
not yet enough, with respect to that confusing circumstance. Ten
years ago, in 1963, the Service was able to audit 3,054,700
individual returns through its office-audit operation, in part because 62.1 percent of those audits were completed solely through
correspondence. 68 Critics of that operation-and this writer was
one-maintained that thousands of those individuals capitulated
too quickly and paid more than they owed, only because their
technical understanding of the tax terrain made it impossible for
them to respond wisely to a correspondence-type audit. The Service's growing awareness of this fact hopefully was one of the
factors which prompted it, albeit slowly, to modify the audit
program. In contrast to that earlier 62.1 percent proportion of
correspondence-type audits, by 1971 the proportion had dropped
to just over one-third of all audits, 6 9 the balance being accommodated by the more time-consuming but far more trustworthy
interview-type audit. This fairly dramatic change in the type of
audits conducted, which was surely appropriate in the interest of
justice, was accomplished even though it involved some added
cost to our tax system: for the change in emphasis at least contributed to the otherwise disturbing fact that, although the Service's
office-audit operation had been able to examine just over three
million returns in 1963, by 1971 this figure had dropped to about
half that number. 70
The change in emphasis just described did not, however, affect
two other subsequently discussed dilemmas long peculiar to a
small taxpayer undergoing an audit.
C. The First Shortcoming of the Iceberg's Base:
The Examiner's Advocacy Role
The first such dilemma arises toward the end of the initial audit.
Assume that the examiner had already solicited sufficient innecessary to file only 173 opinions. This was because in 1,672 cases, the Service and the
taxpayers entered into a stipulated settlement prior to trial, with another 434 cases being
dismissed either because of a failure by the taxpayer to proceed with the case or because
of a finding that the Small Claims Division lacked jurisdiction. Data furnished by the Tax
Court.
68 Unpublished data furnished by the IRS.
69 Unpublished data furnished by the IRS.
70 Unpublished data furnished by the IRS.
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formation about the situation to enable him to measure, as he sees
it, the substantiality of the taxpayer's side of the argument and has
decided, at least on balance, that he should set up a proposed
deficiency. Assume further, however, that the examiner himself
still has some doubt about the matter. Given this set of facts, the
problem is whether the examiner should try to persuade the small
taxpayer to sign a form 870 and agree to the deficiency or whether
instead he should openly express doubt about the matter and
explain not only arrangements regarding administrative appeals
but also, in quite realistic terms, the settlement policies followed
by the Service's higher field echelons.
A difficulty with the first approach, involving an examiner who
seeks to persuade the taxpayer to agree, emerges because often
the amount involved is so small that the taxpayer cannot afford
representation and typically is not represented. Furthermore, instead of being confident and knowledgeable in this context, the
small taxpayer, typically knowing nothing about the niceties of tax
law or what evidence is really helpful, assumes the existence of
tax expertise on the part of anyone who works for the Service,
and expects that each such employee has at least been instructed
to be impartial as well as completely open and above board with
all citizens. 7 ' In consequence, many such taxpayers will capitulate
if the examiner hides his own doubts and seeks, through persuasion, to obtain agreement to his proposed deficiency. 72
For two reasons, this frequently will lead to injustice. The first
reason is that, not suprisingly, examiners of the type who audit
small returns can be wrong, particularly in deciding close questions. After all, the setting involves an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the least sophisticated of the Service's audit
staff and the least sophisticated and knowledgeable of our taxpayers. Too often the latter are in no position to meet the examiner's arguments head on, to the end of helping the examiner
understand why a given deficiency would be error.
More concrete evidence is also available to show that errors
can be made in these circumstances. Of the office-audit-type taxpayers subjected to a deficiency, relatively few appeal the examiner's determination. Nevertheless, these appeals do represent a
large absolute number, totaling 16,508 in 1971. 73 Dispositions
regarding earlier counterpart cases are revealing. Before the 1964
precedural change regarding appeals within the district, of 38,536
appeals to a district conferee, small taxpayers were fully sustained
L. H. WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 34.
In 1967, examiners themselves secured agreement in over 99 percent of the officeaudit deficiency cases. L. H. WRIGHT, supra note 5 1, at 33.
73 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 23.
71
72
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as to the principal issue in 21.1 percent of the cases and were
partially sustained in another 28.5 percent. 74 As to the period
since the 1964 procedural change, in 1967, the latest year for
which data has been published, conferees and office-audit taxpayers who appealed reached agreement in 71 percent of the
cases. Significantly, in these settled cases the examiner's own
proposed deficiencies were reduced by an average of 57 percent. 75
In fairness to the Service, however, one should understand,
first, that both sets of these figures involve distortions which
significantly magnify the real degree of error, because of offsets
that necessarily occur. Illustratively, in the context of a divorced
couple, one taxpayer is sustained as to a deduction which the
other then loses. While these offsets clearly do not account for the
whole range of errors below, it should not be supposed that errors
approaching the proportion reflected in the balance of these appeals are currently being made among the office-audit cases not
appealed.
Nevertheless, these figures, coupled with the lack of sophistication of unrepresented small taxpayers, suggest that the first
need is to require examiners, if they have some doubt about the
validity of a deficiency which they nonetheless believe should be
set up, to inform the affected taxpayer about their doubts. This
course would serve to indicate to the taxpayer that it is at least
conceivable that the District Conference Office might reach a
result somewhat more favorable to the taxpayer.
Because office-audit personnel are the least skilled of the audit
staff, some IRS officials have been reluctant for them to express
personal doubts about the adjustments they make. Yet it is hardly
becoming of the government to trust such an auditor to decide a
question against small, completely unknowledgeable taxpayers,
but not trust that same auditor to take the further step of admitting doubts he may have, particularly where without this further
step the taxpayer probably will concede the issue.
D. The Second Shortcoming of the Iceberg's Base:
The Need for a Convenient
Small-Case Settlement Office
If the small taxpayer, being forewarned, chooses to appeal, the
second need of the system bears on the ultimate types of justice
available. To the small taxpayer, the convenience of that justice
also will be of great importance.
74 L. H. WRIGHT, supra note 51, at 35.
75 Id. Cf. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1973, at 25, col. 5 (table i).
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Where an apparently arguable issue is of the type which a
court, to conform to the statute, would have to decide entirely for
the government or entirely for the taxpayer, it is not enough to say
that a small taxpayer may carry his case on a pro se basis to the
Small Claims Division of the Tax Court. This is not enough if
only because, in the instance of larger cases not calling for
so-called "guinea pig" treatment, the taxpayer is afforded an election: to settle his case administratively at the regional level on the
basis of mutual concessions responsive to the anticipated litigation hazards, or to carry the case to the Tax Court with the
attendant risk of a complete win or complete loss. The existence
of such an election can be easily defended, both in terms of justice
and the necessities of administering the tax system. To elaborate
further here, however, on details showing these to be awesomely
compelling justifications7 6 would carry the discussion too far
afield from some things which here are much more pivotal.
Far more central to our concern are three other facts. First, in
larger cases, a taxpayer dissatisfied with an examiner's determination can easily afford to take his case first to the District Conference office and then to the regional level to which the previously
described complete settlement authority is reserved. Second, the
reason that the system generates so relatively few tax cases actually tried by courts is that in the great preponderence of disputable larger cases, the taxpayer, on reaching the regional level,
chooses to settle on the basis of mutual concessions responsive to
the anticipatedlitigation risks-, rather than actually litigate. Third,
if a small taxpayer in such a situation is to have an equally
realistic chance for an administrative settlement based on mutual
concessions geared to the litigation hazards, it is imperative that
the complete type of settlement authority now theoretically reserved to the regional level 77 be delegated, as to small deficiencies, to the more conveniently located, circuit-riding District
Conference Office.
Settlement authority of the type just mentioned is now restricted in the case of the conference office to situations where a
"substantially identical issue or pattern case" previously had been
disposed of by the regional Appellate Division. 78 The practical
need, in terms of the interest of small taxpayers, to eliminate this
restriction, given otherwise appropriate and complementary monetary ceilings on the settlement authority exercised at the District
Conference level, is more important in the interest of equity than
76 See L. H. WRIGHT, supra note 5 1, at 9.
77 1971 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP. 23.
78 Rev. Proc. 68-30, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 9 15.
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are theoretical objections resting on the notion that, by training or
experience, district conferees are less suited to the settlement task
than are the less accessible regional level conferees.
E. Conclusions Concerning Enforcement Practices
One must bear in mind that any such change will have been in
vain unless, in small cases, both examiners and district conferees
are also instructed to think of themselves, even at the point of
audit, as extensions of the Service's taxpayer assistance program.
This should mean, first, that if an examiner has some doubt about
a matter but concludes, on balance, that a deficiency should be set
up, he ought to reveal his doubt, simultaneously explaining in
realistic terms the appeal machinery, and noting the possibility-not more-that the District Conference office might reach
a result more favoiable to the taxpayer. Second, district conferees, in small cases, should be given the true type of settlement
authority presently reserved to the regional level and should be
instructed in such cases to be as fair in their settlement practice as
they would be if the case had turned on a large issue where the
taxpayer was well represented.

